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The New World of Corporate Lawyering in Japan
Eric Sibbitt*

I. BACKGROUND

Tokyo used to be a sleepy little legal market for most US law firms. There were
exceptions of course, but the Tokyo presence of a number of international firms with
a Tokyo office amounted to a single partner. In fact, while firms may have made
grander claims as to the number of resident lawyers, some Tokyo offices of major
international firms comprised nothing more than an ill-attended fax machine and a
skeletal secretarial staff supplemented, on an as-rarely-needed basis, by visiting
lawyers from other offices. Many of the lawyers that did reside full-time in Tokyo
offices spent a significant portion of their time knocking on doors in Japan and other
countries in Asia, or assisting with overflow work from deals originating in Hong
Kong and elsewhere. That has all changed.
Despite a prolonged economic recession in Japan-or perhaps more correctly
because of it-and a downturn in the world economy, the Japanese offices of many
major international law firms have been busier in recent years in terms of average
hours worked per lawyer than any other office in their global networks.
In fact, except for the grandfathering of a handful of foreign lawyers that began
practicing in Japan within a few years after the end of the Second World War, it is
only since 1987 that foreign lawyers were legally permitted to set up shop in Japan,'
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and even then under restrictive conditions designed to thwart their success and limit
their influence on the practice of law in Japan. Foreign lawyers had to go through a
lengthy application process to claim the lofty title of gaikokuho gaikokujimu bengoshi
("foreign law solicitor" or "GJB," as foreign lawyers use the term), could not hire or
form partnerships with Japanese lawyers, and were restricted in their ability to use
their firm's name. A number of gradual reforms have encouraged the emergence of a
less abnormal market for international legal services in Japan, though remaining
restrictions continue to retard the emergence ofJapan as an international legal services
market consummate with its global economic importance. Prominent GJBs in Tokyo
seeking "unrestricted freedom of association' between foreign and Japanese lawyers
continue to go head-to-head with protectionist elements within Nichibenren (the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations). Even today, foreign law firms cannot hire Japanese
lawyers directly (though curiously, foreign businesses can) nor form partnerships with
Japanese lawyers, though a number of firms have taken advantage of a limited form of
joint venture, unique to associations of non-Japanese lawyers with Japanese lawyers,
called a tokutei kyodojigyo (joint specified enterprise").
I am an associate at the Tokyo office of Sullivan & Cromwell, an office that,
including the two Japanese lawyers in the tokutei kyodo jigyo, has grown from five
lawyers to twelve in the three years since I transferred to Tokyo from the New York
office. The former office was a three-lawyer office suite located in the metallic gray
halls of a Japanese insurance company and facing the grounds of the Emperor's
residence. Air-conditioning at the old office shut off automatically at 6:00 p.m.,
presumably not a problem when working past that time may have been less common,
but, if the workload warranted it, it gave rise to literal "sweatshop" conditions during
the humid summer months in Tokyo. My first workspace there was the one and only
conference room, overlooking the train platforms and bullet trains of Tokyo Station.
Soon after my arrival, however, we moved into more spacious digs in one of the most
modern office buildings in Tokyo-a move motivated by a skyrocketing increase in
demand for international legal services. The new space is now fully occupied, and the
Tokyo office has been perhaps the busiest office of the firm in recent years on a per
lawyer basis. Although twelve lawyers is a small number for a major firm in most
other major legal markets, it is larger than the size of most Japanese firms, a mid-size
presence for the Tokyo office of a US law firm, and the largest US law office in Tokyo
focusing on capital markets work. The office was one of the first to take advantage of
the tokutei kyodo jigyo arrangement and has participated, on the underwriter or issuer
side, in a majority of the initial listings of Japanese companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange or quoted on the NASDAQ National Market.
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II. TRANSFORMATION OF THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL
AND LEGAL MARKETS

The work of international law firms in Tokyo may be roughly divided into
"inbound" work from foreign clients conducting activities in Japan and "outbound"
work for Japanese companies conducting work abroad. Examples of inbound work
include the purchase of a stake in or assets of a Japanese company or entering into a
joint venture. Although inbound work typically involves large elements of Japanese
law, foreign firms are often retained for their expertise in cross-border transactions
and transactions with legal implications in multiple jurisdictions or to supervise the
coordination of legal advice. Outbound work includes selling securities abroad and
overseas acquisitions. Outbound work may be conducted directly in the Tokyo office,
or the Tokyo office lawyers may serve as intermediaries for work conducted by
lawyers located in other offices.
Although the work in which I have been involved in Tokyo includes as diverse
areas of corporate law as syndicated lending, joint venture work, and mergers and
acquisitions, perhaps 80 percent of my time in Tokyo has been devoted to securities
offerings by Japanese issuers. The balance of work at other firms differs. Some firms
have churned out significant numbers of hours on securitizations, mergers and
acquisitions, and general corporate work. Firms such as Tokyo Aoyama Aoki/Baker
& McKenzie and White & Case have even emerged as relatively large providers in
Japan of a wide range of legal services, even covering some domestic litigation and tax
advice.
Several years ago, there would have been virtually none of the capital markets
work that now occupies most of my time. Why this transformation? Part of the
reason is that many Japanese companies simply have little choice. Back when authors
were writing about 'Japan as number one," large sectors of the Japanese economy had
seemingly unlimited access to cheap domestic capital, primarily debt financing from
Japanese banks often within the same corporate group or keiretsu. Japanese issuers
could also supplement this funding source with debt offerings in the euromarkets.
With the collapse of the stock and land price bubble and over a decade of economic
stagnation, access to cheap domestic capital has become less readily available. Even
though Japanese interest rates remain virtually zero, it is difficult for many companies
to borrow money. Japanese financial institutions have focused on their massive debt
problems and have become more conservative in their lending practices. More
generally, international lending to Japan has been subject to a 'Japan premium" and a
number of previously creditworthy companies have seen their ratings from
international agencies downgraded. At the same time, tapping the European markets
for cheap debt has become more costly for many companies than in the past, or in
some cases impossible. In the current environment, the only debt financing vehicles
for many companies are high-yield or convertible bonds, permitting the investor to
claim a higher priority than a shareholder in the event of bankruptcy. The collapse of
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the Mycal supermarket chain even put a partial temporary stop to new issuances in
the commercial paper market in Japan. In short, the cost of capital has been raised and
the ability to access domestic capital has been reduced for many companies in Japan.
The difficulty in accessing cheap debt capital has contributed to the demand for
capital-raising on the equity markets. This trend reinforces the longer-term trend
away from an economy dominated by direct financing (for example, loans from banks)
to indirect financing (for example, securities offerings).
A domestic stock market that seems to be in perpetual decline can absorb only a
limited amount of new equity issuances. Companies wishing to raise capital through
new issuances must also compete with existing shareholders desiring to unload shares,
including company founders seeking to cash out and other shareholders desiring to
reduce their equity holdings. Competition for investor money in a declining market is
increased by periodic government sales of enormous stakes in formerly wholly
government-owned companies. The deficit-ridden government and its budget-makers
in the Ministry of Finance have made sell-offs in government-owned companies a
regular part of their budget calculations. Companies restructuring their operations, a
number of whom have suddenly taken a seemingly first time interest in return on
equity, have felt pressure to reduce their mocbiai, or cross-shareholdings, the equity
glue that holds together the once vaunted keiretsu. Mergers among bank institutions
have led to additional pressures to sell in order to avoid violating anti-monopoly law
limits on shareholding percentages in operating companies by financial institutions.
The convergence of such selling pressures has put substantial downward pressure on
stock prices in Japan.
Under such conditions, existing shareholders wishing to sell shares may consider
several options. They could gradually sell off these shares in the market, but this may
lead to sustained downward selling pressure on the stock, limiting the ability to realize
the best price for the holding. Moreover, the thin trading volume of many Japanese
issues, partially the result of the fewer number of shares and higher price of those
shares, may mean that a gradual sell-off may be difficult to achieve and may require an
extended period of time. A holding could also be reduced through a large privately
negotiated "block-trade" of a large holding, but finding a willing buyer of such large
stakes in a stagnant market is not easily done.
Increasingly, the alternative has been to do an underwritten offering of the stock
to attempt to increase investor interest, diversify the investor base and thereby
increase demand for the stock, and boost the stock price, or at least retard downward
pressure on share prices. Issuer involvement is necessary to produce an offering
document with adequate disclosure, and issuers are often willing to undertake and
even bankroll such offerings for the purposes of reducing selling pressure and
maintaining good relations with their larger shareholders. Increasingly, rather than
doing an offering only in Japan, these offerings have been also directed outside Japan,
primarily to the United States and Europe. Expanding beyond Japan increases the
potential market for the shares, reducing short-term selling pressure in the Japanese
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market by reaching out to a broader community of investors. In some instances, the
pricing on foreign markets may even be more attractive, as was true for a number of
technology-related offerings in the United States at the height of the Internet bubble.
Issuers opting to do an offering abroad, whether a secondary offering of the
existing shares of certain shareholders, a primary offering of newly issued shares to
raise capital for the company, or a combination of the two, face a fundamental choice
between doing a public offering or a private placement. Due to a variety of reasonsincluding the onerous ongoing disclosure obligations associated with doing a public
offering in the United States, the ongoing costs of preparing US GAAP financial
statements or Japan GAAP financial statements reconciled to US GAAP, and the
fear of increased exposure to litigation in the United States-the majority ofJapanese
issuers have traditionally opted for a private placement done pursuant to Regulation S
and Rule 144A. For some, such a private placement may be a "one-off' offering to
raise money for the company or reduce the stake of an existing large shareholder,
while for others this may be a "toe-in-the-water" offering preparing the company for a
later public offering and listing.
An increasing number of Japanese issuers, however, have opted to do public
offerings. The number ofJapanese issuers choosing to list in the United States, even
without an offering, has also been increasing dramatically. Listings on exchanges are
generally driven by a combination of factors. Listings may be motivated by a belief that
a larger investor base, higher valuations, and a greater number of financing optionsand hence a lower cost of capital to the company-could be achieved by listing
abroad. For some, listing in the United States provides a stock currency with which to
make acquisitions in the United States. Others see listing as a means of acquiring
added prestige and drawing attention from investors, analysts, the media, and
potential business partners. Still others are motivated by the desire to
"internationalize" by subjecting themselves to the rigors of international investor
scrutiny and disclosure requirements. In this regard, although the rash of disclosurerelated scandals has somewhat tarnished the reputation of US capital markets, the
speed with which the United States has responded with legislative and regulatory
reforms has impressed many Japanese observers used to a slower, more gradual
approach to reform. Listing in the United States and complying with what are widely
regarded as more stringent disclosure standards are still seen as a hallmark of
transparency in Japan.
Listing on an exchange generates further ongoing legal work as foreign issuers
strive to meet ongoing disclosure obligations. Issuers require legal services from USqualified attorneys, ranging from assistance with the preparation of annual reports on
Form 20-F, review of English language press releases and certain interim disclosures
on Form 6-K, and review of compliance with additional requirements for the
exchanges on which they list, to coordination of the timely disclosure of information
in multiple countries.
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III. THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN TOKYO
Practicing US law in the Tokyo office of a New York firm sometimes has a bit of
a frontier feeling to it. Foreign offices such as those in Tokyo are thinly staffed,
perhaps due in part to the expense of expatriate employees and the dearth of qualified
professionals with the appropriate language background and a desire to live abroad for
years at a time. Without the same hierarchy one would face in New York, an associate
in a foreign office at any given level of seniority probably has more responsibility, and
as a result more is expected of a lawyer, than an associate at the same level of seniority
in New York. With a limited number of lawyers and a greater degree of mutual
interdependence than would generally be true in a large office environment, the esprits
de corps is probably also higher than would be typical in a large office. More senior
lawyers have a vested interest in ensuring that more junior lawyers are developing the
proper skills, as it will make their lives easier later on. This contrasts with the situation
at the junior level in many firms in New York, where after working with someone
once you may never see them again. On the downside, the range of work tends to be
more limited, the workload is onerous, and downtime between transactions is
minimal. Working on international transactions from a foreign office also requires
long and irregular hours, as lawyers must coordinate with clients, lawyers, and
regulators in multiple time zones.
While in the past it was not uncommon for meetings to be in English or for
professional translators to be provided to translate for non-Japanese-speaking foreign
lawyers, this is less common today. Although many companies have a few employees
adept in English, this typically does not extend to most members of the company,
particularly senior management. As a result, with the exception of some drafting
meetings involving discussion of English documents, most of the meetings I attend
and conversations I have with clients are conducted primarily or entirely in Japanese.
However, non-Japanese-speaking attorneys also play significant roles in the practice of
law in Japan, as documentation remains primarily in English and language ability is
not a proxy for legal expertise.
Lawyers are generally more highly regarded in Japan than in the United States.
This probably stems in part from the approximately 3 percent passage rate for the test
to enter the sole training institute for lawyers in Japan (Shiho Kenshujo), and from less
of an association of lawyers with excess litigiousness. In addition, there are a limited
number of US lawyers in Japan. Issuers tend to rely more on foreign lawyers than
domestic clients would in the United States, because of the language barrier and
limited familiarity with US regulations. Lawyers not only translate the law, but serve
as intermediaries between the client and a different legal and business culture and
approach to regulation.
The globalization of financial markets also requires that the practice of securities
law be multi-jurisdictional. A securities offering by a Japanese issuer may involve
multiple offerings and possibly separate syndicates of underwriters in Japan, the
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United States, and elsewhere. An overseas offering requires preparation of an English
language prospectus and hiring of foreign lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers. The issuers and underwriters will typically have their own separate Japanese
counsel and US counsel. The issuers will also have Japanese and/or US qualified
accountants working on the financial statements, depending on whether the financial
statements are presented in US GAAP or Japanese GAAP. The inclusion of UK,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Japanese, Italian, German, Dutch, and other legends in the
document, depending upon where the securities may be sold, may also entail review by
lawyers qualified in other jurisdictions. Publicity and research report guidelines must
also be devised to ensure compliance with restrictions in multiple jurisdictions.
IV.

IMPACT OF US LAW ABROAD

From Tokyo, one can also see the impact of US regulations abroad. The
Investment Company Act of 1940,2 for example, prevents a number of otherwise
willing Japanese companies from listing or engaging in capital-raising efforts in the
United States. The Investment Company Act generally deems companies with
"investment securities" exceeding 40 percent of their non-cash assets to be investment
companies, subjecting such companies to regulation like a mutual fund. The 40
percent standard was devised in the context of what typical US operating companies
looked like at the time of its enactment. However, of particular significance to
Japanese companies, the term "investment securities" generally includes minority
shareholdings in other companies. In Japan, the business practice of maintaining
cross-shareholdings in the range of 1 to 5 percent in business partners and affiliated
companies means that a number of companies exceed or come close to this threshold.
Companies that come close to the 40 percent threshold and wish to raise capital in the
United States must carefully monitor their holdings and generally have to sell off
securities and maintain massive amounts of cash in bank accounts or US Treasuries,
US tax laws can also have adverse effects. For example, passive foreign
investment company ("PFIC") rules, designed to prevent US investors from avoiding
tax on passive assets (such as rent or royalties) by using foreign corporations to hold
these assets, have the effect of creating potential material adverse effects for US
investors holding ADRs or shares in a foreign company deemed to be a PFIC.
Although PFICs occasionally list on US exchanges and conduct offerings in the
United States, the regulations potentially subject holders of shares in these companies
to more onerous tax and reporting obligations.

2.
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The recently passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act3 has also caused concern in Japan.
Japanese issuers have traditionally been granted "home country" exemptions from the
corporate governance requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
marketplace rules to the extent home country practice diverges from these
requirements. For example, very few Japanese companies have independent directors
or audit committees, and instead are required to appoint kansayaku ("statutory
auditors") in addition to the board of directors to perform various oversight functions.
Although the extent to which a number of the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
apply to foreign issuers is currently unclear, the sweeping provisions of the act appear
to require stricter disclosure requirements and potentially changes in corporate
governance requirements. It is unclear whether the new law may dissuade some
Japanese issuers from participating in the public US capital markets or whether it will
come to be seen as merely an additional cost to access the most important public
capital markets in the world.
V. CONCLUSION

The frenetic pace of activity for US transactional lawyers in Japan is likely to
continue, though it may be slowed by the recent dips in financial markets worldwide
and the environment of regulatory uncertainty in the United States created by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The unabated globalization of financial markets and trade
means that cross-border legal services will continue to flourish. The need for efficient
provision of international legal services will encourage more collaborative effort among
Japanese and US counsel, and may also eventually encourage the Japanese government
to move further toward the "freedom of association" among legal professionals
characteristic of other leading OECD countries. Against this backdrop, Tokyo will
remain an interesting vantage point from which to observe and participate in the everincreasing globalization of the practice of corporate law.
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§§ 7201 et seq (Supp 2002).
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